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A PROPOSED CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULE FOR
ATTORNEY-MEDIATORS
Michelle D. Gaines
Abstract: Maintaining the success and fairness of mediation requires mediators to be
impartial toward all parties and to protect the confidentiality of mediation sessions. Attorneymediators encounter conflicts of interest, based on prior or subsequent representation of
clients, that can disrupt impartiality or confidentiality. When attorneys practice mediation, it is
unclear where they should look for guidance: attorney rules of professional conduct, mediator
ethical standards, or both. Additionally, attorney-mediators encounter unique issues that
ethical guidelines designed for attorneys or mediators do not address adequately. This
Comment proposes a comprehensive conflict of interest rule for inclusion in the Rules of
Professional Conduct that is tailored specifically to attorney-mediators.

The integrity of mediation as an alternative form of dispute resolution
depends largely on the ethics of mediators. To promote the success of the
process and protect the rights of the parties, mediators must remain
impartial and must preserve the confidentiality of mediation sessions.
Conflicts of interest involving past or future professional relationships
can undermine confidentiality and call into question mediators'
impartiality. Attorneys who practice both mediation and law are
particularly likely to find themselves in situations where the role of
"impartial mediator" conflicts with the role of "loyal advocate."'
The lack of clear ethical guidance for attorney-mediators has become
more apparent as more attorneys have entered the practice of mediation.
Ethical standards for mediators vary from non-existent to highly
comprehensive depending on the jurisdiction. Even in jurisdictions with
comprehensive mediator ethical guidelines, the relative authority of
attorney rules of professional conduct and mediator ethical standards
may not be clear to attorney-mediators.
The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct (Washington
Rules) were amended in 1993 to bring attorney-mediators under the
1. Attorney-mediators face many other difficult ethical dilemmas. Indeed, it has been suggested
that all mediators should be specifically governed by comprehensive ethics rules covering
areas such as "self-determination," "impartiality," "competence," "fees," "advertising and
solicitation," and "confidentiality." AAAIABA/SPIDR Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators,
reprinted in John D. Feerick, The Lawyer's Duties and Responsibilities in Dispute Resolution:
Toward Uniform Standardsof Conductfor Mediators, 38 S.Tex. L. Rev. 455 app. A, at 478-84
(1997) [hereinafter Model Standards]; see also Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators (Michie 1996);
Iowa Code Ann. app. § 598 (West 1996).
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conflict of interest rule for judges, arbitrators, and law clerks.2 Although
this amendment acknowledges the need for conflict of interest rules
governing attorney-mediators, its provisions are ultimately inadequate.
Recent case law, rules adopted in other jurisdictions, and ethical
guidelines promulgated by professional organizations demonstrate that
the unique advocacy relationship between attorneys and clients calls for a
more comprehensive conflict of interest rule for attorney-mediators than
Washington Rule 1.12, and its counterparts in other states, provide.
Part I of this Comment provides background on mediation and the
need for conflict of interest rules for attorney-mediators. Part II describes
the current approaches to resolving conflicts. Part Ill argues that the
current approaches are inadequate. It proposes a comprehensive conflict
of interest rule for attorney-mediators that should be adopted as part of
the Rules of Professional Conduct in all states.
I.
MEDIATION AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS FOR
ATTORNEY-MEDIATORS
A.

The Function andNature ofMediation

Mediation differs from other forms of dispute resolution because it is
informal and facilitated by impartial mediators who lack authority to
command decisions.3 In essence, mediators help conflicting parties
voluntarily reach a settlement.4 Unlike arbitration and mediationarbitration ("med-arb"), mediation parties are not bound to abide by the
decisions of the mediator.5 Mediation also differs from negotiation,
which is less formal than mediation and generally takes place between
the parties or their attorneys without the aid of an outside facilitator.

2. Washington Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12 (1995).
3. Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transitionfrom Theory to Implementation: Designing
a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants,the Process and the Public
Interest, 1995 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 5-6 (1995).
4. Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process: PracticalStrategiesfor Resolving Conflicts 14
(1st ed. 1986); see also Model Standards, preface, supra note 1, at 478; Leonard L. Riskin, The
SpecialPlaceofMediation in Alternative Dispute Processing,37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 19, 24 (1985).
5. George Friedman, A Guide to Mediation and Arbitrationfor Business People, in Insurance
Coverage Litigation 1998, at 361, 367 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
577, 1998).

Attorney-Mediator Conflicts of Interest
Despite these identifiable characteristics, mediation is not easily
defined. The increasing use6 and lack of regulation of mediation 7 have
created opportunities for many different types of professionals to practice
mediation in a variety of settings, for a variety of purposes.' Mediators
come from many walks of life; they may be attorneys, therapists,
counselors, or employees of administrative agencies.9 The diversity
among mediators and the freedom to experiment produce a wide range of
styles and procedures" that fall along a continuum, ranging from
primarily evaluative to primarily facilitative. 1
The context of the mediation and preferences of the parties often
affect the role and responsibilities of the mediator. 2 For example, in a
complex, "high stakes" case, such as a labor mediation, where the parties
would likely be represented by legal counsel, the process may remain
somewhat adversarial. 3 In such settings, mediation is used to resolve
material differences while preserving business relationships and avoiding

6. Because there are many types of mediation, it is difficult to quantify the increase in use of
mediation. See infra note 8. Many jurisdictions encourage mediation through state-approved dispute
resolution centers and mandatory mediation programs. See, e.g., 710 Il. Comp. Stat. Ann. 20/1
(West 1997) (dispute resolution centers); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.75.010 (1996); Island and San Juan
Counties, Wash., L.R. 23 (West 1998) (mandatory mediation); see also John Lande, How Will
Lanyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 839, 839-40
(1997); Sharon Press, Building and Maintaininga State-Wide Mediation Program:A View from the
Field,81 Ky. L.J. 1029, 1029 (1993).
7. Washington, like many jurisdictions, has no certification or licensing requirements covering all
mediators, so anyone can offer mediation services. In many court-adjunct mediation programs, only
court-approved mediators who meet certain criteria are allowed to mediate. See, e.g., Island and San
Juan Counties, Wash., L.R. 23(3). See generallyJamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the
Model Standardsof Conduct ofMediators,2 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 87, 96-97 (1997).
8. See Note, The Sultans ofSwap: Defining the Duties and Liabilitiesof American Mediators, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1876, 1878-82 (1986) (discussing three general types of mediation: grass roots
communitarian, professional problem-solving, and court-adjunct systems).
9. Telephone interview with Laura Pierson, Director of Dispute Resolution Center and Snohomish
and Island Counties, Wash. (July 24, 1998).
10. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, CourtMediation and the SearchforJustice Through Law, 74
Wash. U. L.Q. 47, 53-54 (1996) (noting wide variety of practices to which label "mediation" is
attached); Leonard L. Riskin, UnderstandingMediators'Orientations,Strategies,and Techniques: A
Gridforthe Perplexed, 1 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 7, 8 (1996).
11. See Lande, supra note 6, at 850 n.40; Riskin, supranote 10, at 23-24.
12. See Lande, supra note 6, at 845, 853 (discussing different approaches to mediation, noting
that "reconcilers" are likely to be community and family mediators, and observing that while
"empowerers" are unlikely to be selected by parties represented by lawyers, they might be selected
by disputants acting alone); Note, supranote 8, at 1877-78.
13. Cf Lande, supra note 6, at 846 & n.23.
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the costs and publicity of litigation. 4 The mediator is often considered an5
expert who takes on a more evaluative and problem-solving role.'
Alternatively, in a more informal, "low-stakes" setting such as a

neighborhood property line dispute, the parties may not be represented
because litigation might not be a viable option. Here, the focus is often
on enhancing the parties' autonomy and empowering them to develop

their own solutions. 6 The mediator generally takes on a less active role,
facilitating the process by emphasizing self-determination and improved
communication, rather than stressing the most efficient settlement of
material issues. 7
B.

The Importance of MediatorImpartialityand Confidentialityin
Successful andFairMediation

Regardless of mediator style and context, the mediator's impartiality
is critical to the success of the mediation and the protection of the
parties' rights. 8 Mediator impartiality 9 instills trust, enables the parties
to collaborate and share information with the mediator and other
parties, 20 protects mediation agreements from subsequent challenges,2'

14. Id.
15. See Note, supra note 8, at 1880 (describing community-based volunteer mediators as handling
essentially private conflicts or interpersonal matters, in contrast to "highly-trained" problem-solving
mediators).
16. Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at 54-55 (discussing mediation's effect ofenhancing parties selfdeterminative capabilities).
17. Id.
18. See Henikoff& Moffitt, supra note 7, at 101 (noting importance of neutrality to virtually all
proposed mediator ethics codes).
19. Practitioners and scholars debate the meaning of "neutral" and "impartial" and to what extent
mediators can and should be neutral or impartial. See Leda M. Cooks & Claudia L. Hale, The
Constructionof Ethics in Mediation, 12 Mediation Q. 55, 62-63 (1994); see also Moore, supra note
4, at 15. In this Comment, the term "impartial" or "impartiality" will be used to signify an absence of
relationships that might significantly impair the mediator's ability to function in an unbiased manner
toward the parties.
20. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995) (explaining
success of mediation depends greatly upon mediator maintaining neutral stance while preserving
confidences).
21. See McEnany v. West Delaware County Community Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523, 532 (N.D.
Iowa 1994) (involving challenge to validity of mediation settlement on grounds that mediator was
biased through past representation of party by his law firm); John D. Feerick, The Lawyer's Duties
and Responsibilities in Dispute Resolution: Toward Uniform Standardsof Conductfor Mediators,
38 S.Tex. L. Rev. 455,466 (1997).

Attorney-Mediator Conflicts of Interest
and helps prevent abuse of the process.' In addition, an appearance of
impartiality promotes public confidence in the fairness of the process.'
Maintaining the confidentiality of mediation proceedings is equally

important." Mediators may learn confidential information through
mediation sessionsY Many states, including Washington, protect
mediation confidences through a statutory privilege that prevents
mediation communications from being later used in court.26 These
statutes recognize that without a promise of confidentiality, parties might
be unwilling to disclose information necessary for settlement, thus
seriously hampering mediation's effectiveness. The mediator's duty of
confidentiality has also been recognized under contract theory, evidence

22. Because mediation occurs without the procedural protections of litigation and parties are
sometimes not represented, mediators must monitor the process to ensure that it is not abused to the
advantage of one side, and that any agreement is voluntary and meets minimal standards of societal
fairness. See Feerick, supra note 21, at 462-63; Kirtley, supra note 3, at 8 n.38; see also NolanHaley, supra note 10, at 66-71; Leonard L. Riskin, TowardNew Standardsfor the Neutral Lawyer
in Mediation, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 329, 354-59 (1984). See generally Edward F. Sherman,
Confidentialityin ADR Proceedings:PolicyIssues Arisingfrom the Texas Experience, 38 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 541 (1997). Some jurisdictions address this issue in their mediator guidelines. See, e.g., Iowa
Code. Ann. app. § 598; Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators § Ill, standard 1(b) (Michie 1996); Ga. CL
R., Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules, app. C(A), standard I(B) (Michie 1998); R. 5 (West 1996);
Kan. CL R. 903(a) (West 1998).
23. See Fla. Mediation R. 10.070(a) (West Supp. 1998). The need for an appearance of
impartiality can be analogized to Washington's requirement that arbitrators disclose conflicts "when
the relationship or circumstance creates a reasonable inference of the presence of bias or the absence
ofimpartiality." Hanson v. Shim, 87 Wash. App. 538, 547,943 P.2d 322,327 (1997).
24. Kirtley, supra note 3, at 8-10. Scholars debate the proper role of confidentiality within
mediation. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation: Law, Policy & Practice 14, 119
(2d ed. 1994); Feerick, supra note 21, at 469 & n.55; Sherman, supra note 22, at 542-44. However,
most professional organization guidelines for mediators require some level of confidentiality. See,
e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-576.9 (Michie Supp. 1997); Model Standards, supra note 1, at 481,
standard V; see also Joel M. Douglas & Lynn J. Maier, Divorce Mediation's Debt to Labor
Mediation: Bringing the PartiesApart, 49 Disp. Resol. J. 29, 34 (1994); Kirtley, supra note 3, at 1
n.4 (listing numerous sources addressing mediation confidentiality); Alison Smiley, Professional
Codes and Neutral Lawyering: An Emerging Standard Governing NonrepresentationalAttorney
Mediation, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 213,217, 245 (1993) (discussing reasons for confidentiality).
25. McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857, 862 (D.V.I. 1997); Poly
Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1493-94.
26. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 5.60.070, 7.75.050 (1996). For a detailed list of mediation privilege
statutes and rules in various states, see Kirtley, supra note 3, at 2-3 nn.6-7.
27. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 904.085(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("The purpose of this section is to
encourage the candor and cooperation of disputing parties, to the end that disputes may be quickly,
fairly and voluntarily settled."); Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1494; see also Bruce A. Biltman,
Mediation in Florida:The Newly Emerging Case Law, 70 Fla. B.J. 44, 50 (1996); Kirtley, supra
note 3, at 8.
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theory, and common law.2" Although this duty to protect confidential
information varies by jurisdiction and by the parameters set by each
mediator, 9 it should at least extend to the expectations of the parties.3"
C.

ProtectingImpartialityand Confidentiality:the Needfor Conflict
ofInterest Rules for Attorney-Mediators

When attorney-mediators alternate between the roles of impartial
mediator and loyal advocate, unique conflict of interest problems arise
that may interfere with the duties of impartiality and confidentiality."'
These conflicts of interest can be divided into two categories, according
to the chronology of the relationships involved.32
First, during mediation an attorney-mediator may have a conflict of
interest based on prior or concurrent client representation. 3 The

attorney's role as loyal advocate for clients raises doubts about his or her
impartiality in a mediation between a former client and a third party. For
example, one court has held that attorneys cannot represent clients in
divorce proceedings and then impartially mediate in a subsequent
divorce mediation.34 Moreover, concurrent representation of a mediation
party indicates an undeniable lack of impartiality and invites potential
abuse of confidential information learned during mediation.

28. Kirtley, supra note 3, at 10-14.
29. Moore, supranote 4, at 160.
30. See Model Standards, supranote 1, at 481-82, standard VI. Cf PolySoftware, 880 F. Supp. at
1494.
31. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyer's Responsibilities, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 407,
437-38; see also McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (D.V.I.
1997); Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1494-95; McEnany v. West Delaware County Community
Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523, 533 (N.D. Iowa 1994); State v. Tolias, 135 Wash. 2d 133, 954 P.2d 907
(1998).
32. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31, at 434. Conflicts of interest of other types also arise,
including material or personal conflicts of interest. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.8 (governing material conflicts of interest). Additionally, prior mediation could create conflicts of
interest for later mediation. See Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators § IlI, standard 5(b)(3). Both of
these areas are beyond the scope of this Comment because they are not specific to attorneymediators and do not directly relate to the attomey-mediator's cross-profession practice.
33. McEnany, 844 F. Supp. at 533 (involving challenge to validity of mediation settlement
agreement on grounds that mediator's law firm previously represented one party); see also Ebersole
v. Ebersole, No. 0115765, 1994 WL 146238, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 1994).
34. Ebersole, 1994 WL 146238, at *1.

Attorney-Mediator Conflicts of Interest
Second, an attomey-mediator may encounter conflicts with clients
based on prior mediation." Subsequent representation of a party to a
mediation or a client who is adverse to a former mediation party, in a
matter that substantially relates to the mediation, can raise a conflict of
interest between the attorney-mediator's duty to protect confidential
information learned in mediation and his or her duty to advocate
zealously for the new client. Furthermore, subsequent representation of
such individuals on any matter might imply that the mediator was not
unbiased during the mediation, or that he or she unethically used
mediation to solicit clients.
In addition to these direct conflicts, conflicts may be imputed to
attorney-mediators through conduct of other members of their firms.
Attorney-mediator rules, like attorney-client imputed client rules, should
provide guidance for attorney-mediators sharing professional and
financial interests with associates who have prior, concurrent, or
subsequent professional relationships with mediation parties.3 6
II.

CURRENT SOURCES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES
FOR ATTORNEY-MEDIATORS

Several efforts have been made to address comprehensively the
unique ethical issues facing attorney-mediators through specific tailoring
of rules.37 Professional associations have proposed guidelines to govern
mediator ethics 38 and many jurisdictions have adopted court rules or
statutes governing mediator ethics in general.39 Other jurisdictions have
merely applied the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model

35. In several cases, attempts have been made to disqualify attorneys for conflicts of interest
based on past mediation. See McKenzie Constr., 961 F. Supp. at 859; Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at
1491-92; Tolias, 135 Wash. 2d at 135, 954 P.2d at 911; see also Feerick, supranote 21, at 464-66.
36. See Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1490; Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.9(c),
1.10.
37. For a description of the most comprehensive of these guidelines, see infra note 88. For
another set of standards that specifically addresses attorney-mediators, but does so less
comprehensively, see ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes (1984),
reprintedin Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 633 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon,
Jr. eds., 1993) [hereinafter ABA Standards for Family Mediators]; see also Proposed Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Who Conduct Divorce and Family Mediation, ABA Family Law Section Task
Force (July 1997) <www.mediate.com/ethiesabafamstds.cfin> (on file with author) [hereinafter
Proposed Standards for Mediators].
38. Seeinfranote4l.
39. See infra notes 50-56.
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Rules).4" However, none of the existing approaches adequately address
all conflict of interest situations attorney-mediators may face, and the
multitude of different standards creates confusion rather than clarity.
A.

General Conflict of InterestRulesfor Mediators

No universal conflict of interest rules for mediators exist. Rather, a
wide array of rules promulgated by professional organizations, courts, or
legislatures govern mediator conduct.4 In 1994, the American
Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution proposed a set of comprehensive
ethical guidelines for mediators: the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators (Model Standards).4 2
The Model Standards address conflicts of interest arising before,
during, and after mediation.43 A mediator must disclose to the parties "all
actual and potential conflicts of interest that are reasonably known to the
mediator and could reasonably be seen as raising a question about
impartiality for the mediation." This requires mediators to disclose all
current or past professional relationships with any party or lawyer
involved in the mediation.4' The parties can waive a conflict of interest
after disclosure and consultation unless the conflict casts serious doubt
on the integrity of the process.46 Following mediation, a mediator may
not, without the consent of the parties, "establish a professional
relationship with one of the parties in a related matter, or in an unrelated

40. See infra Part lI.B.2.
41. See Model Standards, supra note 1; AFM-AFCC Standards of Practice for Divorce and
Family Mediation <www.mediate.com/ethics/afmstd.cfi> (on file with author); Code of Ethics of
the American Arbitration Association for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (adopted 1977) in
Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards510-21 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr. eds.,
1993). Other professional organizations have created internal rules guiding mediators who operate
under the auspices of their programs. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Mediation
Rules (Oct. 1, 1994) <www.arbiter.wipo.intla and m center/mediation-rules/index.html> (on file

with author).
42. For text, see Feerick, supra note 1, at 478. The Model Standards have been adopted in whole
or in part in at least two jurisdictions. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
43. Model Standards, supra note 1, at 479-80, standard III.

44. Id.
45. Feerick, supra note 21, at464.
46. Model Standards, supra note 1, at 479-80, standard Ill.

Attorney-Mediator Conflicts of Interest
matter under circumstances which would raise legitimate questions about
the integrity of the mediation process. '
When the Model Standards are applied to attorney-mediators, a
number of gaps emerge.48 The Model Standards address only
representation of "parties," failing to address the possibility that
subsequent representation of other clients might also undermine the
confidentiality or appearance of impartiality of the original mediation."9
In addition, the Model Standards do not address imputation of a conflict
of interest to or from other members in a firm.
State and local governments have also regulated conflicts of interest
between mediators and mediation parties. Some have adopted the Model
Standards"0 or other existing codes of ethics."' Minnesota has adopted an
enhanced version of the Model Standards that prohibits future
professional relationships with anyone on a related matter without
consent for a "reasonable" period of time.52 Several other jurisdictions
have promulgated very basic rules that merely require mediators to check
for conflicts of interest and either recuse themselves when participation
would be inappropriate or disclose the situation to the mediation parties
and continue only if consent is given.53 Finally, several jurisdictions have
47. Id.
48. Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 7, at 88; Michael Moffitt, Loyalty, Confidentiality, and
Attorney-Mediators: ProfessionalResponsibility in Cross-ProfessionPractice, 1 Harv. Negotiation
L. Rev. 203,207 (1996).
49. Model Standards, supra note 1, at 479-80, standard III. Subsequent representation of any
adverse client on a related matter might reasonably cause fear of a breach of confidentiality. Moffitt,
supra note 48, at 209. Likewise, subsequent representation of any client against a mediation party
shortly after mediation would detract from the mediator's appearance of neutrality.
50. See, e.g., Kan. Ct. R 903 (West 1998); S.C. Ct. R., Alternative Dispute Resolution, Family
Court Mediation, app. B (West 1997).
51. West Virginia applies Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to its mediators. See W. Va.
CL Rules of Procedure for Court-Annexed Mediation, R. 27 (Michie 1998); see also W. Va. Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E) (Michie 1998). California Bankruptcy courts refer attorney-mediators
to the California Rules of Professional Conduct. See C.D. Cal. Bankr. Order No. 95-01 (5.4) (West
1998). Several federal district courts have applied 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994), a federal disqualification
statute governing justices, judges, and magistrates, to mediators through local court rules. See, e.g.,
N.D. Cal. Alternative Dispute Resolution L.R. 6-3, 2.5 (West 1998); D. Idaho Gen. Order No. 130
(West 1997); E.D.N.Y. Civil Rules app. F(4), R. 28 (West 1998); E.D. Tenn. L.R. 16.4(f), (g)
(West 1997).
52. Minn. Dist. CL Prac. R. 114 app. II (West Supp. 1998).
53. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-576.9 (Michie Supp. 1997); C.D. Cal. Bankr. Order No. 95-01
(5.4) (West 1998); D.D.C. CL R. app. B (Michie 1998); Ill. 17th Cir. Med. R. 4(A)(3) (West 1997);
Mo. S. CL R. 88.06(a)(4) (West Supp. 1998); N.H. Super. CL R. 170(d)(2) (Michie Supp. 1995);
Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts app. F & G (McKinney 1998).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:699, 1998

developed comprehensive ethics rules for mediators that address crossprofession conflicts of interest specifically. 4 For example, Maine has
added a separate comprehensive mediation section to its attorney conduct
rules55 and Iowa has adopted a special rule for attorney-mediators in
family disputes. 6
B.

Application ofAttorney Rules ofProfessionalConduct

1.

As Written, the Model Rules Do Not Apply to Attorney-Mediators

The Model Rules are written and designed for attorneys in an
adversarial setting and are premised upon the existence of an attorneyclient relationship. 7 The language of the Model Rules conflict of interest
provisions is directed at "attorney-client" relationships, 8 not mediation
' The comments
parties because mediation parties are not "clients."59
to
Model Rule 2.2, which governs intermediation by attorneys among two
or more clients, specifically exempt attorney-mediators who conduct
mediation involving non-clients, referring them instead to ethical
guidelines developed by professional mediation associations.' Thus, on
their face, the Model Rules do not govern attorney-mediators. 6'
54. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 4-21.5-3.5-16, 22, 23 (Michie Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23603(d) (1995); Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators, § III, standard 5(b) (Michie 1996); Santa Barbara
County, Cal. Ct. 1 644.4 (West 1998); Fla. Med. R. 10.070 (West Supp. 1998); Ga. Ct. R, ADR
Rules app. C(A), standard Ill (Michie 1998); Ill. 16th Cir. Ct. R. 15.22 (West 1997); D. Neb. L.R.
53.2(g)(4)-(9) (West 1998); E.D. Tenn. L.R. 16.4(f)-(g) (West 1997). The scope of these rules
varies by jurisdiction; some apply to all court-appointed mediators or mediators registered with a
dispute resolution center, while others apply only to domestic or family mediation.
55. Me. BarR. 3A() (West 1997).
56. Iowa Code Ann. app. § 598 (West 1996).
57. Sandra E. Purnell, Comment, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent Conflict of Interest?,
32 UCLA L. Rev. 986, 991-92 (1985).
58. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rules 1.7-1.10.
59. Purnell, supra note 57, at 1007-08. For an analysis of whether mediation is the practice of
law, see id. at 991-1008.
60. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.2, cmt.; Purnell, supra note 57, at 991-92;
Smiley, supra note 24, at 222-23. However, at least two state ethics opinions have disregarded these
comments and applied Rule 2.2 to attorney-mediators. See, e.g., Fla. Advisory Op. 86-88 (1986);
Ky. Op. E-335, reprintedin 53 Ky. Bench & Bar, Summer 1989, at 47; see also Judith L. Maute,
Public Values and PrivateJustice: A Casefor MediatorAccountability, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 503,
511-12 (1991). Even if Rule 2.2 applies, it does not provide enough guidance to attorney-mediators
to protect the integrity of the process. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1493
(D. Utah 1995); ABA/BNA Manual on Professional Conduct 51:15001 (1997).
61. A new addition to the Model Rules would add an additional wrinkle to this issue. It would
require attorneys to act according to appropriate professional standards when not acting as attorneys,

Attorney-Mediator Conflicts of Interest
2.

Application ofRules of ProfessionalConduct Conflict oflnterest
Rules to Attorney-Mediators

Despite language that forestalls application of the Model Rules to
attorney-mediators, two federal courts have looked to the Model Rules
for guidance in cases involving subsequent representation of mediation
parties by attorney-mediators. s2 One court noted, "[w]here there is no
specific rule that speaks to the issue, courts refer to the Model Rules as a
guide to regulate the conduct of the attorney who serves as a mediator in
Alternative Dispute Resolution [ADR] proceedings who is later involved
in the matter in which he or she mediated."'63 The Supreme Court of
Washington took an alternative approach when it amended its Rules of
Professional Conduct to include attorney-mediators in conflict of interest
rules for judges and arbitrators.'
a.

Case Law Applying the Model Rules to Attorney-Mediators

At least two federal district courts have addressed the application of
the Model Rules to attorney-mediators. In Poly Software International,
Inc. v. Su, an attorney who had previously mediated a dispute involving
two software companies later represented one of the parties against
another on a substantially related matter.6' The adverse party moved to
disqualify the attorney-mediator, and the court granted the motion.' The
court discussed Utah Rule 1.9 (conflicts based on previous attorneyclient relationships) and Utah Rule 1.12 (conflicts based on previous role
as judge or arbitrator).67 While Utah Rule 1.12, like the Model Rule,
and mandate that "law-related activities" be conducted in accordance with the Model Rules conflict
of interest provisions. See Model of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7. While the variety of services and
processes provided by attorney-mediators makes it difficult to generalize, it is likely that some
attorney-mediators provide "law-related services" and in so doing, would be covered by the Model
Rules. See generally Rodgers & McEwen, supra note 24, at § 10.02. However, given the difficulty
of determining when an attorney-mediator's actions constitute "representation," a provision directly
guiding attorney-mediators is necessary to prevent confusion and mistake. let
62. McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D.V.I. 1997); Poly
Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1493.
63. McKenzie, 961 F. Supp. at 860 n.3.
64. Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12.
65. 880 F. Supp. at 1488-89. At the time of mediation, the opposing parties in the subsequent
lawsuit were on the same side because they were employees of the same software company.
66. Id. at 1491, 1495.
67. I at 1494. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(a) prohibits representing a client
whose interests are materially adverse to a former client on a same or substantially related matter
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prohibits subsequent representation in the "same matter," the broader
Utah Rule 1.9 prohibits subsequent representation in the "same or a
substantially factually related matter., 68 The Poly Software court utilized
the "substantially related" standard from Utah Rule 1.9 when it held that
"[w]here a mediator has received confidential information in the course
of a mediation, that mediator should not thereafter represent anyone in
connection with a same or substantially related matter unless all parties
to the mediation proceeding consent after disclosure."'69 The court
supported this choice by arguing that, in terms of confidentiality and
trust, the relationship between mediator and party is more closely related
to the attorney-client relationship than to the relationship between judge
and litigant.7" The court's rule encompasses subsequent representation of
anyone in a substantially related matter.!
Another recent case, McKenzie Construction v. St. Croix Storage
Corp., addressed whether an attorney-mediator's conflict may be
imputed to her law firm.72 The litigation in this case involved subject
matter identical to an earlier mediation and neither side disputed that the
attorney-mediator should be disqualified under Model Rule 1.9.73 The
McKenzie court applied Model Rule 1.10 and disqualified the mediator's
entire law firm.' The court noted that although the conflict arose through
mediation rather than representation, the analysis was the same and the

unless the former client consents after full disclosure. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.10(a) prohibits members of a firm from representing a client if another member of the firm would
be disqualified under Model Rule 1.9 (or other rules). Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.12(a) prohibits representation of anyone in connection with a matter in which a lawyer
participated substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, or law clerk unless all
parties consent Rule 1.12(c) provides that if a lawyer is disqualified by Rulel.12(a), then no
member of that lawyer's firm may undertake or continue representation unless the disqualified
lawyer is screened and gives notice to the appropriate tribunal.
68. Utah Rule 1.9 differs from Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 in that it contains a
"substantiallyfactually related" standard, whereas the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9
contains a "substantially related" standard. Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1492 n.7. In Washington,
the analysis would likely not differ because Washington has adopted a "factual context" analysis in
interpreting "substantially related." See infra note 121.
69. Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1494.
70. McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857, 861, 863 (D.V.I. 1997); Id at
1492-93.
71. See Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1494.
72. 961 F. Supp. at 859.
73. Id. at 859.
74. Id. at 862.
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Model Rules should apply absent a specific rule governing mediators."
Although the law firm asserted that it had screened the attorney-mediator
by erecting a "cone of silence," the court found the firm's method of
screening insufficient to protect the mediation parties, in part because
evidence showed that the attorney-mediator had personally contacted the
firm's investigator for the case.76
If the theory of these decisions is correct, then at least in these
jurisdictions attorney-mediators should look to the Rules of Professional
Conduct for guidance. However, aside from the analysis in these two
decisions, attorney-mediators have little guidance in applying the Rules
of Professional Conduct. Because the Model Rules are tailored to
attorney-client relationships, it is difficult to translate them into language
that fits the relationship between mediators and parties. Also, the Rules
of Professional Conduct conflict of interest rules do not address issues
involving the attorney-mediator's impartiality; they only address
subsequent representation in related matters. This leaves attorneymediators without guidance on questions such as whether prior
representation creates a conflict of interest during mediation, or whether
subsequent representation in unrelated matters constitutes a conflict of
interest.77
b.

Washington Includes Attorney-Mediators in Rule 1.12

In 1993, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized the importance
of conflict of interest issues for attorney-mediators by amending
Washington Rule 1.12, the conflict of interest rule for judges,
adjudicative officers, arbitrators and law clerks, to include mediators.78
This Rule prohibits a lawyer from representing "anyone in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, mediator
or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding consent
'
after disclosure."79
The Rule also imputes this type of conflict to
75. Id.at 860.
76. It is not clear whether this court would ever allow screening, because it found here that the
law firm's attempt at screening was inadequate. See id. at 858, 862.
77. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3 1, at 432; Moffit, supranote 48, at 204.
78. Washington is the only jurisdiction that includes mediators in the text of its Rule 1.12. North
Dakota has indicated in its comments to Rule 1.12 that the term "adjudicative officer" includes
mediators, so apparently it is similar to Washington.
79. Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12.
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members of the mediator's law firm.80 Although this is a unique
approach to regulating attorney-mediators, like the Poly Software rule, it
addresses only subsequent representation in related matters and omits
significant areas of concern for attorney-mediators. 8' Furthermore, the
guidelines expressed in Rule 1.12 are even more limited than those
guidelines expressed in Poly Software because they address only

"same matter" rather than the "same or
subsequent representation in8 the
2

substantially related matter."
In a decision later overturned by the Supreme Court of Washington, a
court of appeals panel applied Washington Rule 1.12 and reversed a
criminal conviction wherein a county prosecutor had attempted to
resolve an ongoing dispute between neighbors and later successfully
prosecuted one of the parties on a felony charge arising out of the same
dispute. 3 The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the
prosecutor's actions while mediating had violated the appearance of
fairness doctrine.84 Although the supreme court later overturned the
appellate court decision because the appearance of fairness issue was not
properly raised at the trial court level,85 the issues in the case highlight
the need for clarity regarding the rules guiding attorneys who mediate.86

80. Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12(c).
81. Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
82. Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D. Utah 1995).
83. State v. Tolias, 135 Wash. 2d 133, 135, 954 P.2d 907,908 (1998).
84. Id. at 138, 954 P.2d at 909. The court of appeals decision that the appearance of fairness
doctrine had been violated was based largely on a finding that the prosecutor had violated
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12. State v. Tolias, 84 Wash. App. 696, 702, 929
P.2d 1178, 1181 (1997).
85. Id. at 140-41.
86. In adopting a conflict of interest rule such as the one suggested in this Comment, a court
should clarify when the rule would apply through a definition of mediation. Tolias highlights the
current lack of clarity about what constitutes mediation. See Tolias 135 Wash. 2d at 135, 954 P.2d at
909 (discussing State's argument that the "mediation" was actually "plea bargaining"). Although
Washington has legislation encouraging mediation and authorizing dispute resolution centers, it has
no definition of "mediation" or "mediator," unlike other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 710 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 20/2(b)-(c) (West 1997); W. Va. Ct. Rules of Procedure for Court-Annexed Mediation, R. 2
(Michie).
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C.

ProposedAmerican BarAssociation Conflict of InterestRulesfor
Attorney-Mediators

In 1991, the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee in
Dispute Resolution (SCODR)"7 proposed a comprehensive set of
attorney-mediator ethics rules.8" The SCODR proposal, although not
adopted by the ABA,89 acknowledged the need for a rule specifically
governing attorney-mediators by suggesting an amendment to the Rules
of Professional Conduct." The SCODR proposed this set of rules
because attorney-mediators lacked sufficient guidance regarding which
conflicts of interest rules applied to them in the context of mediation.9"
The proposal addressed conflicts of interest with the following rules:
(a) A lawyer may act as mediator only if the lawyer has not
previously nor is currently representing one of the parties in
conjunction with the subject matter of the mediation.
(b) A lawyer may act as a mediator in a dispute involving a past or
present client, who was or is represented in a matter unrelated to
the mediation, [provided there is disclosure, informed consent, no
breach of confidentiality or impartiality]. This does not prohibit
intermediation between clients, which is interpreted by Rule 2.2

[or EC 5-20].

87. The SCODR is no longer in existence.
88. Smiley, supra note 24, at 235. Two jurisdictions have adopted rules that, like the ABA
proposal, comprehensively address all three areas (prior, concurrent, and subsequent representation).
Maine's ethical code for attorneys contains a provision governing attorney-mediators. It states that
prior to mediating, attorney-mediators must disclose any relationships likely to affect impartiality or
appearance of impartiality; during mediation, attorney-mediators cannot represent either party in
court on a same or related matter;, and following mediation, attorney-mediators shall not represent
any party on the same or any related matter. Me. Bar R. 3.4(h)(3), (5) (West 1997).
The court rules of one Illinois district provide that prior to mediating, any prior professional
relationship with either party must be disclosed and each party must consent in writing; during
mediation attorney-mediators may not represent either party on any matter, and following mediation
attorney-mediators may not represent either party in a dispute between the parties. Additionally,
attorney-mediators associated with law firms shall not mediate if any other associate would be
prohibited from mediating. I1. 16th Cir. Ct. R. 15.22 (West 1997).
89. ABA/BNA Manual on Professional Conduct 51:1515. (1997); Smiley, supra note 24, at
235-36.
90. See Smiley, supra note 24, at 234.
91. Id.
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(c) A lawyer may not act on behalf of any party to a mediation, nor
represent one such party against the other, in any legal proceeding
related to the subject of the mediation.92
This rule comprehensively addresses prior, concurrent, and subsequent representation. However, it does not address conflict of interest
imputation to an attorney-mediator's law firm. Additionally, like the
Model Standards, the rule only addresses subsequent representation of
mediation parties in related matters and does not address other adverse
clients.
III. PROPOSED ATTORNEY-MEDIATOR CONFLICT OF
INTEREST RULE
A.

Need For Comprehensiveand Uniform Conflict ofInterest Rules

In all but the few jurisdictions that have adopted comprehensive rules,
attorney-mediators practice without practical, authoritative conflict of
interest guidelines.93 The confusion over whether and in what manner
attorney ethical rules or mediator ethical standards apply can be
corrected by adopting a definitive and comprehensive conflict of interest
rule for attorney-mediators. The Supreme Court of Washington
recognized the need for a rule by amending Rule 1.12. All states should
amend their Rules of Professional Conduct to include a comprehensive
conflict of interest rule covering all aspects of conduct both during and
after mediation.
The following proposed rule has two parts. The first addresses
conflicts that arise during mediation through prior or concurrent
representation. The second addresses conflicts that arise following
mediation during subsequent representation. Within each section, the
proposed rule is further divided into subsections addressing the type of
protection that should be extended: an absolute prohibition of mediation
or representation or a conditional bar that can be waived by the parties or
lapse over time. Each section also contains a subsection addressing
whether and to what extent a conflict of interest should be imputed to or
from the attorney-mediator's firm.
92. For full text of the 1991 proposed rule "Lawyers Acting as Mediators for Non-Clients"
[hereinafter ABA Proposal], see Smiley, supranote 24,235-36 (1993).
93. Two exceptions are Maine and Illinois 16th Dist., supra note 88.
94. See, e.g., Me. BarR. 3A(h) (West 1997).

Attorney-Mediator Conflicts of Interest
The level of restriction will depend on how the timing of the
representation, the relatedness of the matters in controversy, and the
identity of the prospective client affect impartiality and confidentiality.95
Overly broad restrictions could be used to disqualify an attorney or
mediator or to upset a mediation settlement agreement on technical
grounds when the impartiality or confidentiality of the mediation is not
actually threatened.96 Too strict a construction would unduly discourage
attorneys from entering the practice of mediation. The proposed rule
should apply to all types and contexts of mediation.9"
B.

ProposedRule

Following is a proposed conflict of interest rule and commentary
explaining the need for each subsection and how each rule balances the
competing concerns. The commentary should be included as part of a
complete ethics rule for attorney-mediators.
1. Conflicts Arising Before or During Mediation
(a) A lawyer shall not act as a mediator if the lawyer has
previously represented one of the parties in a same or
substantially related matter, or is currently representing one
of the parties on any matter.
(b) A lawyer shall not act as a mediator in a dispute involving a
past client who was represented in an unrelated matter unless
the parties consent in writing after disclosure and consultation
and the past representation would not cast serious doubt on
the integrity of the process.
(c) A lawyer shall not mediate a dispute involving a party
concurrently represented by a member of the lawyer's firm on
a same or substantially related matter. A lawyer shall not
mediate a dispute involving a party concurrently represented
by a member of the lawyer's firm on other matters or
formerly represented by a member of the lawyer's firm on

95. For a list of issues that should be addressed in any rule and an alternative categorization of
these issues, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31, at 433-34.
96. See Jonathan J. Lerer, An Overview of the Law Governing Legal Conflicts of Interest, 403
PLIILit 9,53-55 (1990); Moffit, supranote 48, at 210.
97. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995); MenkelMeadow, supranote 31, at 434 n.116,436-37; Smiley, supranote 24, at 237.
98. See Note, supranote 8, at 1877.
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any matter, unless the requirements of l(b) are met and the
lawyer is screened from all participation in the representation
(if ongoing) and apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. 9
2. Conflicts Arising After Mediation
(a) A lawyer who has formerly mediated may not represent
anyone who is directly adverse to a mediation party in a same
or substantially related matter.
(b) A lawyer who has formerly mediated may not represent a
mediation party, or any client who is directly adverse to a
mediation party, in any matter for a period of two years unless
the affected mediation parties consent in writing after
disclosure and consultation.
(c) If a lawyer has formerly mediated, no member of the lawyer's
firm may undertake or continue to represent anyone who is
directly adverse to a mediation party in a same or
substantially related matter unless all affected mediation
parties consent in writing after disclosure and consultation, or
the lawyer is screened from any participation in the
representation and apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.
No member of the lawyer's firm may represent a party to the
mediation in any matter for a period of one year, unless the
mediation parties consent in writing after disclosure and
consultation.
IV. COMMENTARY ON PROPOSED RULE
A.

Commentary on Section 1: Restrictions on the Ability to Mediate
Following CertainAttorney-ClientRelationships

Many attorney-mediators practice mediation after long legal careers
involving many clients, simultaneously practice both law and mediation,
or practice mediation as members of law firms. In some situations, a
previous or existing attorney-client relationship with a mediation party
might undermine impartiality or confidentiality. In others, the attorneyclient relationship might be such that the attorney-mediator can set it
aside and mediate objectively and in full confidentiality. The specific
guidelines suggested by this proposed rule should be construed only as a
99. Screening procedures should meet the requirements outlined in Washington Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10(c).
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threshold. Because of the fact-dependent nature of ethical dilemmas,
attorney-mediators should always use their judgment in deciding when to
disclose information about past or existing attorney-client relationships
and when to decline to mediate, with an eye toward protecting the
integrity of the mediation process."e
1.

Section 1(a): Absolute ProhibitionofMediation
(a) A lawyer shall not act as a mediator if the lawyer has previously
represented one of the parties in a same or substantially related matter,
or is currently representing one of the parties on any matter.

a.

ConcurrentRepresentationof a Party in Any Matter

An absolute rule barring mediation for current clients on all matters is
necessary to protect the confidences of the mediation parties and
preserve the impartiality of the mediator. When the concurrent
representation relates to a same or substantially related matter, the need
for an absolute restriction is most evident. If a prior mediation failed and
the dispute was litigated, the attorney would be hard-pressed to maintain
confidentiality to the former mediation parties while fulfilling the duty to
advocate zealously for the client."0 Even if the concurrent representation
were unrelated to the mediation, and confidentiality were not threatened,
an absolute bar would be justified because of the impartiality
requirement. If one of the parties were also a client, the element of
loyalty present in any attorney-client relationship would give the client
an actual or perceived advantage over the other party, thereby
undermining the success and fairness of the mediation."2
Absolute rules regarding concurrent representation, like the one
suggested here, have been adopted in several jurisdictions.0 3 The ABA
100. See Model Standards, supra note 1, at 479-80, standard IL.
101. For example, following a business merger, an attorney-mediator could not act as a mediator
between the shareholders of both companies while simultaneously litigating an employment issue
relating to the merger against one of the companies without neglecting one of these duties.
102. Even if an attorney-mediator could remain impartial in mediating between a client and nonclient, such mediation would likely violate the attorney's responsibility to represent clients diligently
under Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3.
103. See, e.g., Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators, § III, standard 5(b)(4) (Michie 1996); Iowa
Code Ann. app. § 598, R. I(F) (West 1996); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-603(d) (1995); Ill. 16th Cir. Ct. R.
15.22(F)(1) (West 1997); see also Proposed Standards for Mediators, supra note 37, standard
IV.D.1.
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Proposal, however, absolutely prohibits concurrent representation in
conjunction with the subject-matter of the mediation, but allows waiver
by the parties if the attorney-mediator is concurrently representing one of
the parties on an unrelated matter. 10 4 Even consent cannot overcome the
clearly apparent bias that would result if one of the mediation parties had
an ongoing professional relationship with the mediator. Consent would
not remove the incentive for the attorney-mediator to favor his client
during the mediation in order to preserve the ongoing relationship. An
absolute prohibition of concurrent representation of mediation parties is
needed to protect participants who might not understand the conflict of
interest inherent in such a situation, as well as to protect the process
against the appearance of unfairness.
b.

PriorRepresentation of a Party on the Same or Substantially
RelatedMatter

When an attorney-mediator has previously represented one of the
parties on a same or substantially related matter, an absolute bar to
mediation is justified based on the strong appearance of bias inherent in
such a situation. For example, in Ebersole v. Ebersole, an attorneymediator initiated a dissolution of marriage proceeding on behalf of a
client, and later acted as a mediator between the former client and spouse
in the same proceeding. 5 Because the attorney had advocated zealously
for the client under Connecticut Rule 1.3, the court held that it could not
"accept counsel's assertion that he may then retire as advocate and
assume the role of impartial mediator." ' 6 The ABA proposal'0 7
suggested providing an absolute prohibition when the prior
representation was on a same or substantially related matter, while

104. See Smiley, supra note 24, at 239. Some jurisdictions adopt a similar approach. See, e.g.,
Me. Bar R. 3.4(h) (West 1997) (prohibiting representation of party during mediation on related
matters or unrelated matters so long as other representation won't be improperly affected and
impartiality can be preserved); E.D. Tenn. L.R. 16.4(f) (West 1997) (prohibiting appearances as
counsel in same or substantially related matter).
The Model Standards add an additional subjective requirement of limiting the use of waiver on
unrelated matters to situations in which it would not "raise legitimate questions about the integrity of
the mediation process." Model Standards, supra note 1, at 480, standard Il.
105. No. 0115765, 1994 WL 146238 (Conn. Super. Ct Apr. 19, 1994).

106. Id. at*l.
107. See supra note 92.
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providing a less absolute restriction in other cases. This method provides
a balance lacking in many other approaches."' 8
2.

Section I (b): ConditionalProhibitionofMediation
(b) A lawyer shall not act as a mediator in a dispute involving a past client
who was represented in an unrelated matter unless the parties consent
in writing after disclosure and consultation and the past representation
would not cast serious doubt on the integrity of the process.

a.

PriorRepresentation of a Partyin UnrelatedMatters

When an attorney-mediator has represented one of the parties on an
unrelated matter, disclosure of the past relationship and consent from the
parties is necessary to eliminate the impression of bias that might arise if
the information surfaced after commencement of mediation. Even if the
parties consent, the attorney-mediator should not mediate if he or she

believes the past representation would cast serious doubt on the integrity
of the mediation." 9 Prior representation of one of the parties on an
unrelated matter is unlikely to affect an attorney-mediator's ability to
remain impartial during a mediation. The attorney-client relationship has
ended and presumably the attorney-mediator has not established an
adversarial relationship with any of the parties. Due to the element of
loyalty in an attorney-client relationship, however, potential bias or
appearance of bias toward the former client remains."1 If a party learns
of a prior relationship during or after mediation and loses trust in the
impartiality of the mediator, the mediation could fail. If an agreement has
108. Some local rules and professional standards are more strict, absolutely prohibiting mediation
based on any past representation of one of the parties. See, e.g., AFM-AFCC Standards of Practice
for Divorce and Family Mediation, supranote 41; Iowa Code Ann. app. § 598, R. I(F) (West 1996);
Proposed Standards for Family Mediators, supranote 37, standard IV(C).
Other rules are less strict, allowing mediation so long as the attorney-mediator discloses any past
representation and waiver by consent of the parties. See, e.g., E.D. Tenn. L.R. 16.4 (West 1997); Ala.
Code of Ethics for Mediators, § I,standard 5(b)(6) (Michie 1996); Fla. Med. P. 10.070(b)(3) (West
Supp. 1998). The Model Standards generally allow waiver of this type of conflict unless it would
cast "serious doubt on the integrity of the process." Model Standards, supra note 1, standard III,
at 480.
109. A similar restriction is found in the ABA proposal, supra note 92, at 235, § (e), Model
Standards, supra note 1, at 480, standard III, and rules adopted in several jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
E.D. Tenn. L.R. 16.4(e), (g) (West 1997); Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators, § III, standard 5(b)(6)
(Michie 1996); Fla. Med. IL 10.070(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998); Ill.
16th Cir. Ct. R. 15.22 (West 1997).
110. Cf.Feerick, supra note 21, at 466.
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already been made, awareness of the relationship could be grounds for
challenging the mediation agreement's validity.' By allowing the
parties to waive this restriction, this rule also addresses the concern that
overly broad rules might discourage attorneys from mediating." 2
3.

Section 1(c): Imputationfrom the Firm
(c) A lawyer shall not mediate a dispute involving a party concurrently
represented by a member of the lawyer's firm on a same or
substantially related matter. A lawyer shall not mediate a dispute
involving a party concurrently represented by a member of the lawyer's
firm on other matters or formerly represented by a member of the
lawyer's firm on any matter, unless the requirements of 1(b) are met
and the lawyer is screened from all participation in the representation
(if ongoing) and apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

a.

Absolute ProhibitionofMediation: ConcurrentRepresentation
by Attorney-Mediator'sFirm in a Same or Substantially
Related Matter

Attorney-mediators who practice as members of law firms should not
mediate if an attorney at the firm is concurrently representing one of the
mediation parties in a same or substantially related matter. This absolute
rule is necessary to protect impartiality and prevent breaches of
confidentiality. Because the interests of attorneys practicing in firms are
commingled, concurrent mediation and representation in related matters
by attorneys of the same firm would at least imply a bias in favor of the
client, and, at the worst, result in breaches of confidentiality. This would
be particularly true if the mediation failed and the matter proceeded to
litigation. Although it might be possible for the attorney-mediator to
protect the parties' confidences and maintain impartiality, the appearance
of impropriety of such an arrangement mandates an absolute bar that
does not allow waiver by the parties.

111. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
112. To restrict the possibility of someone obstructively withholding consent after threats to the
mediator's impartiality have passed, a time limit might be placed on this restriction. For example, to

require consent only for mediation occurring within six months of prior representation. See MenkelMeadow, supranote 31, at 435 n. 117.
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b.

ConditionalProhibitionofMediation: ConcurrentRepresentation
by Attorney-Mediator'sFirm in an UnrelatedMatter

If another member of the firm is concurrently representing one of the
parties on an unrelated matter, the potential conflict should be waivable
as long as the integrity of the process would not be seriously threatened.
There may still appear to be a lack of impartiality because the affiliation
of one party with the attorney-mediator's law firm might imply a bias
toward that party. However, on unrelated matters, the opportunity to use
confidential information to the detriment of a party is minimal, and the
issue of impartiality could be adequately addressed by requiring
disclosure and informed consent by the parties. This rule balances the
need to protect the integrity of the process against the goals of
encouraging mediation and preventing attorneys from using
disqualification for tactical purposes." 3 A requirement of screening the
attorney-mediator from all concurrent involvement in the representation
would further ensure the attorney-mediator's independence, impartiality
and confidentiality.
c.

ConditionalProhibitionon Mediation: PriorRepresentation by
Attorney-Mediator'sFirm on Any Matter

If an attorney-mediator's associates have previously represented one
of the parties on any matter, the attorney-mediator should be allowed to
mediate upon disclosure and consent of the parties, as long as the
attorney-mediator reasonably believes impartiality and confidentiality
can be maintained. Prior representation of a party by an attorneymediator's law firm could create an attenuated implication of possible
bias or raise a question about impartiality, but would not likely disturb
the attorney-mediator's impartiality."' Because the relationship with the
client has ended, conflict regarding abuse of confidential information

113. See supra notes 96-97.
114. An imputed conflict of interest was one element of a challenge to the validity of a mediation
agreement in a recent Iowa case, McEnany v. West Delaware County Community Sch. Dist., 844 F.
Supp. 23, 532 (N.D. Iowa 1994). The court held that there was no conflict of interest because the
attorney-mediator was not personally involved in his law firm's prior representation of one of the
parties, and the law firm had only minimal contact with the party. Id. at 533.
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would not likely arise. Informed consent adequately safeguard and
ensure the impartiality of the mediator."'
Imputed disqualification based on past or concurrent representation of

a mediation party by the attorney-mediator's law firm has not been
directly addressed in either the ABA Proposal or the Model Standards.
However, some jurisdictions and professional organizations have
addressed this problem through a variety of guidelines. 6 By absolutely
prohibiting mediation in certain cases, and requiring disclosure and
consent in others, the rule promotes the dual goals of encouraging

mediation and preventing conflicts of interest.
B.

Commentary on Section 2: Attorney-Client Relationship
FollowingMediation

Attorney-client relationships following mediation can call into
question the confidentiality of the mediation session and cast doubt on
whether the mediator was in fact impartial." 7 While attorney-mediators

owe a duty of confidentiality to mediation parties similar to that
attorneys owe their clients, attorney-mediators have an additional
responsibility to protect the integrity of the mediation procedure. By
choosing to mediate, an attorney places herself in a position of trust,
impartiality, and confidentiality vis a vis all the parties. The success of
the process, the durability of mediation settlement agreements, and the

acceptance of mediation as a legitimate form of dispute resolution
depend on the mediator's commitment to maintaining impartiality and an
appearance of impartiality. Actions taken after mediation can destroy this
115. In McEnany, disclosure and informed consent by the mediation parties likely contributed to
the court's decision not to disqualify the attorney-mediator based on an imputed disqualification. Id.
at 526.
116. Some imputation rules promulgated in other jurisdictions are more strict See, e.g., Ill. 16th
Cir. Ct R. 15.22(f)(2), (prohibiting mediation if member of firm is concurrently representing one of
parties on any matter and requiring consent if member of firm has previously represented party on
any matter); Iowa Code Ann. app. § 598, R. I(F) (West 1996) (prohibiting mediation if either party
was previously client of attorney-mediator's firm).
Other rules are less strict, requiring only disclosure and consent for any representation of
mediation parties; see, e.g., Ala. Code of Ethics for Mediators, § Ell, standard 5(c) (Michie 1996)
(requiring disclosure of representation of any mediation party by member of law attorney-mediator's
law firm); C.D. Cal. Bankr. Order No. 95-01 (5.4) (West 1998) (requiring disclosure in writing if
member of attorey-mediator's firm has represented party).
117. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; See also Ga. Ct. R., Alternative Dispute
Resolution Rules, App. C(A), standard III (Michie 1998) (providing that mediators must
scrupulously maintain neutrality).
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appearance and put the legitimacy of a past mediation in jeopardy.
Because the Model Rules aim to protect confidential information,
application of the existing Model Rules to attorney-mediators, such as
Washington Rule 1.12 and the Poly Software rule, does not sufficiently
govern attorney-mediator conflicts of interest following mediation." 8 At
the same time, because the Model Standards were written generally and
broadly to apply to all mediators, they do not adequately address the
post-mediation conflicts attorney-mediators might encounter.
1.

Section 2(a): Absolute ProhibitionofRepresentationin Certain
Cases FollowingMediation
(a) A lawyer who has formerly mediated may not represent anyone who is
directly adverse to a mediation party in a same or substantially related
matter.

Following mediation, an attorney-mediator must not subsequently
represent a client who is directly adverse to a mediation party on a same
or substantially related matter. Neither the Model Standards, Washington
Rule 1.12, nor the Poly Software rule includes an absolute bar against
subsequent representation; instead, they allow all post-mediation
conflicts to be waived by disclosure and consent." 9 Both Washington's
Rule 1.12 and the Poly Software rule are good starting points because
they are designed to provide mediation parties with the same level of
protection of confidential information that clients of attorneys are given.
At the same time, these approaches are too broad and too narrow.
First, the Rules are too broad because they restrict subsequent
representation to "anyone" in the same or substantially related matter
(Poly Software) or the same matter (Washington Rule 1.12). They could
bar even subsequent representation that does not involve the mediation
parties in any way. For example, suppose that following a natural
disaster an attorney-mediator mediates a dispute between a homeowner
and an insurance company. If a neighboring homeowner later seeks
representation against a different insurance company regarding damages
from the same natural disaster, the attorney-mediator would risk
disqualification on the grounds that the matters are substantially related.
118. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31, at 432.
119. For examples of absolute prohibition of subsequent representation, see infra note 123 and

accompanying text.
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This result would be reached despite the fact that the subsequent
representation would harm neither of the original mediation parties. Such
a broad restriction cannot be justified. 20 Instead, application of the

"substantially related" standard to attorney-mediators should only restrict

representation of adverse parties, as in Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9.121
Second, the guidelines in Washington Rule 1.12 and Poly Softvare
are too narrow because allowing waiver by disclosure and consent leaves

too much room for abuse of the mediation process. 22 If subsequent
adverse representation in a same or substantially related matter were
allowed, attorney-mediators would likely encounter conflicts between the
duty to protect confidential information learned during mediation and the
duty to advocate zealously for the client.' 23 Application of the Rules of
Professional Conduct would allow for waiver in such cases, not taking
into account the need to maintain the integrity of the mediation
process-a need that continues even after a mediation has ended. 24
120. A potential problem might occur when the mediator has confidential information that might
be used to the advantage of the new client. A requirement that attorney-mediators be subject to
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (which provides that attorneys shall not agree to
represent clients if duties to third parties would materially limit representation) would prevent the
attorney from undertaking such representation following mediation.
121. Washington has adopted a "factual context" analysis in determining whether a matter is
"substantially related." State v. Hunsaker, 74 Wash. App. 38, 45, 873 P.2d 540, 544 (1994). The
factual context analysis requires the court to consider "whether the factual contexts of the two
representations are similar or related." Id. This is distinguished from a "patently clear" test where the
court considers only whether the issues involved are identical or essentially the same. Id.
122. With regard to the Model Rules for attorneys, in situations so fraught with danger (for
example, material or personal conflicts covered by Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8),
per se disqualification is adopted, so that even consent of the parties will not justify waiving the
restriction. Geoffrey C. Hazard, 1 The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct 123 (1985).
123. An absolute bar can be found in some jurisdictions that restrict only subsequent
representation of a party to the mediation on a same or substantially related matter. See, e.g., Ind.
Code Ann. § 4-21.5-3.5-23 (Michie Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-603(d) (1995); Me. Bar R.
3.4(h)(5) (West 1997). See also ABA Proposal § (f), supra note 92, at 235; Model Standards, supra
note 1, at 479-80, standard III.
Other rules would go further, providing an absolute bar for all subsequent representation of a party
regardless of whether it is on a related or unrelated matter. See, e.g., I11.16th Cir. Ct. R. 15.22(0(1)
(West 1997); see also ABA Standards for Family Mediators, supra note 37, at 636, standard 111(A).
This standard is too harsh, however, because when the matter is unrelated, the possibility for abuse
of confidentiality or impartiality is more attenuated, and an absolute bar would unnecessarily
discourage lawyers from mediating or result in tactical abuse of the conflict of interest rules. See
supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. Further, this standard is not broad enough, in that it only
addresses subsequent representation of parties, not other adverse clients, which would result in some
potential conflicts going unchecked. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
124. Model Standards, supra note 1, at 480, standard HIL.
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Additionally, allowing this type of representation to occur upon consent
of the parties could allow attorney-mediators to use the mediation
process improperly to obtain clients. For example, if an attorneymediator discovered through mediation that one of the parties had a
potentially lucrative case against one of the other parties, and also knew
that if mediation failed he or she might be able to obtain the party as a
client, the attorney-mediator might lose the incentive to encourage
settlement. Allowing such a direct conflict to be waived by consent
would permit manipulation and abuse of less sophisticated or
knowledgeable parties. An absolute bar is justified given the mediator's
likely possession of confidential information and the fact that it would
rarely be in a party's best interest to consent to subsequent adverse
representation by the mediator in a same or substantially related matter.
Washington's application of Rule 1.12 to attorney-mediators has an
additional shortcoming in that its narrower "same matter" standard
would not adequately protect the confidential relationship, as discussed
in Poly Software." The "same or substantially related" standard takes
into account the fact that confidential information learned during a
mediation might be used in the same or related matters.'26
An absolute prohibition of subsequent representation of adverse
clients on a same or substantially related matter would correct the
127
shortcomings in Washington Rule 1.12 and in the Poly Software rule.
Although this rule might proscribe attorney-mediators from representing
a significant pool of potential clients, it is justified by the need to protect
against abuse and preserve the integrity of the process.
2.

Section 2(b): ConditionalProhibitionofRepresentationFollowing
Mediation
(b) A lawyer who has formerly mediated may not represent a mediation
party, or any client who is directly adverse to a mediation party, on any

125. The term "matter," although not explained in Washington case law, has been interpreted to
include "any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for ruling or other determination,
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter
involving a specific party or parties." Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D. Utah 1995). Furthermore, the "same matter is not involved [when] there is lacking the discrete,
identifiable transaction of conduct involving a particular situation and specific parties." Id. (quoting
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 587 F. Supp. 1358, 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
126. Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1495.
127. The concept of absolutely barring related matters and conditionally barring unrelated matters
is found in the ABA Proposal, supra note 92, at 235-36, §§ (d)-(e); see also supraPart IV.A.1.a.
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matter for a period of two years, unless the affected mediation parties
consent in writing after disclosure and consultation.
When considering subsequent representation of a mediation party or a
client adverse to a mediation party, an attorney-mediator should disclose
and obtain informed consent from affected mediation parties for a
defined period of time following mediation.'
First, subsequent
representation of a mediation party on any matter, even if the
representation is not related to the mediation, might imply favoritism or
solicitation of clients. 9 Second, subsequent representation of a client
who is adverse to a mediation party, even if the representation is not
related to the mediation, would likely upset the trust the parties had in the
mediator and cast doubt on the impartiality of the mediator. 3 '
Because this rule is not primarily directed at protecting confidentiality
or the procedural or substantive rights of the parties, but rather at
protecting the appearance of impartiality and preventing solicitation of
clients during mediation, an absolute bar is not justified. A two-year limit
on this restriction and allowance of waiver by consent of the parties
provides the restraint necessary to maintain confidence in the mediator's
impartiality and prevent the attorney-mediator from using mediation to
solicit clients. It also balances the countervailing concerns about
attracting attorneys to the practice of mediation and using
disqualification rules for purely tactical reasons.
Although the Poly Software rule and Washington Rule 1.12 do not
address subsequent representation in unrelated matters, some
jurisdictions have placed a conditional bar on subsequent representation
of mediation parties on unrelated matters,' while others have absolutely
prohibited future representation of mediation parties either on all matters,
or on related matters.'32 This Comment's proposed rule adopts a broad
128. See Feerick, supra note 21, at 466.
129. See Ga. CL R., Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules, app. C(A), standard 11(B), Ex. 1,
Recommendation (Michie 1998) (discussing problems inherent in subsequent contact with mediation
parties); Feerick, supra note 21, at 465.
130. See Feerick, supra note 21, at 465.
131. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. app. § 598 R. (F). (West 1996) (three years); Minn. Dist. CL Prac.
R. 114 app. II (West Supp. 1998) (reasonable time).
132. See supra note 123. The ABA Proposal absolutely prohibit representing mediation parties on
related matters. See ABA Proposal, supra note 92, at 235-36, § (d). On the other hand, the Model
Standards involve a subjective element, restricting representation of mediation parties on unrelated
matters only "when it would cast doubt on the integrity of the process." Model Standards, supra note
1, at 480, standard III.
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yet balanced approach, restricting representation of former mediation
parties and clients adverse to mediation parties, while allowing the
restriction to be waived either by the parties or after the passage of two
years.
3.

Section 2(c): Imputation to the Attorney-Mediator'sFirm
(c) If a lawyer has formerly mediated, no member of the lawyer's firm may
undertake or continue to represent anyone who is directly adverse to a
mediation party in a same or substantially related matter unless all
affected mediation parties consent in writing after disclosure and
consultation, or the lawyer is screened from any participation in the
representation and apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. No member
of the lawyer's firm may represent a party to the mediation in any
matter for a period of one year, unless the mediation parties consent in
writing after disclosure and consultation.

a.

ConditionalProhibitionof Subsequent Representationofan
Adverse Client in a Same or SubstantiallyRelatedMatter

Colleagues at an attorney-mediator's firm should be required to obtain
consent before representing clients adverse to mediation parties in
matters related to the mediation. This will prevent the threat of using
confidential information to benefit another client or harm the mediation
party. If allowed, the attorney-mediator's duty to uphold the parties'
expectations of confidentiality could conflict with the firm's duty to
advocate zealously for the adverse client, resulting in a reasonable fear
that the confidentiality of a mediation session might be breached.
The threat to the mediator's duties of confidentiality and impartiality
in imputed conflicts is not as great as in direct conflicts, so imputed
conflicts should be waivable with the informed consent of the parties. A
law firm should be allowed to screen associates who might be
disqualified from a particular case based on past mediation work.
Screening procedures for attorneys who migrate between law firms and
between the public and private sectors are included in Washington Rules
1.10 and 1.12.. and are accepted in many jurisdictions.'34 Mediators are
133. See Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10.
134. See Karen A. Haase, Note, You Can Check Out Anytime You Like, But You Can Never
Leave: Attorney Conflict of Interest and Imputed Disqualification Under Nebraska's New Bright
Line Rule, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 137, 144-46 (1995).
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ideal candidates for such screening because their duty of confidentiality

extends to the entire mediation, not just individual clients, and therefore
attorney-mediators are not as likely to share information with the rest of
the attorneys in their firms."' The courts in Poly Software and McKenzie
Construction'36 each addressed imputation
to other members of the
37
attorney-mediator's firm in this manner.1
b.

ConditionalProhibitionof Subsequent Representation of a
MediationParty in Any Matter by the Attorney-Mediator'sFirm
Subsequent representation of a party to the mediation on even

unrelated matters raises additional concerns about attorneys abusing the
process to solicit clients for the firm.13 1 Such solicitation could taint the
integrity of the mediation process, 139 discouraging public approval of

mediation and possibly casting doubt on the fairness of past mediation
settlement agreements. As with direct conflicts, this restriction should be
waived either upon consent of the parties or after the passage of one year.
The time period for this restriction on imputed conflicts of interest
should be shorter than the restriction on direct conflicts 40 because the
appearance of impropriety is more attenuated when it is a member of the
attorney-mediator's firm who subsequently represents a mediation party
or adverse client, not the attorney-mediator herself. This approach would
protect the integrity of the process without unduly burdening the

attorney-mediator's law firm.

135. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 31, at 437.
136. 961 F. Supp. 857 (D.V.L 1997).
137. See supra notes 69, 72-76, and accompanying text; see also Ala. Code of Ethics for
Mediators, § E, standard 5(b)(1)(c) (Michie 1996); McKenzie, 961 F. Supp. at 862; Poly Software
Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Utah 1995).
138. Supra note 129 and accompanying text. However, no restriction should be placed on
subsequent representation of adverse clients on unrelated matters. Since confidentiality is not
threatened when the subject matter of the past mediation was unrelated, and because the appearance
of impropriety would be highly attenuated, a restriction on such representation would unduly
discourage attorneys from mediating and could be used by adverse litigation parties for purely
tactical purposes. This rule would be consistent with the result in McEnany v. West Delaware
County Community Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523, 533 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (finding no conflict of
interest in part because mediation was unrelated to prior representation).
139. See supra note 129.
140. See supraPart U.B.2.b.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Mediators must be impartial and mediation must be confidential in
order to create an atmosphere conducive to successful mediation, protect
the rights of the parties based on their reasonable expectations, and
enhance the substantive and procedural fairness of this out-of-court
proceeding. Attorney-mediators' relationships with former and
subsequent clients can call into question the attorney-mediators' own
impartiality and the confidentiality of the mediation. Comprehensive,
balanced conflict of interest rules for attorney-mediators will promote
impartiality and confidentiality within mediation, while minimizing the
potential for tactical use of the rules and ensuring that attorneys are not
unduly discouraged from mediating.
Washington has already recognized the need for such guidance by
amending Rule 1.12 to include mediators. However, recent case law
demonstrates that the "same matter" standard of this rule is too narrow to
protect the interests at stake in mediation and subsequent developments
by professional organizations, and other jurisdictions suggest that a
comprehensive rule should address issues beyond the scope of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. The Washington Legislature should take the
next step by amending the Rules of Professional Conduct to include a
comprehensive rule for attorney-mediators that covers conflicts of
interest that arise both during and after mediation. The proposed rule,
which borrows the best parts of rules professional organizations and
jurisdictions have enacted or proposed, provides a balanced, fair rule that
protects the parties to mediation, preserves public acceptance of
mediation, and encourages attorneys to practice mediation.
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